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Abstract
We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being
forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which
its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about
the value function of the individual ﬁrms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows
the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of
time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction
is a decreasing function of the cartel’s life; that there are circumstances under which
the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case
the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a
given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will
increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel
phase will increase at ﬁrst, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial
stocks.
Keywords: cartels, dissolution, nonrenewable natural resources
JEL classiﬁcation: Q3, L13
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1 Introduction
The static theory of cartels teaches us that a cartel is formed to restrict output relative to that
of a perfectly competitive or oligopolistic industry, thus raising prices and proﬁts. This result
extends to the case of a cartel that faces an intertemporal problem, such as natural resource
cartels: it will, as for a perfectly competitive or oligopolistic industry, follow an output
path that decreases over time until exhaustion, but the exercise of its monopoly power will
generally result in the resource stocks being depleted more slowly than it would in a perfectly
competitive or oligopolistic industry (see Hotelling, 1931, Sweeney, 1977, Pindyck, 1978, or
Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1982).
The theoretical literature on resource cartels has mainly concentrated on the study of the
output and pricing paths of a partially cartelized industry with a competitive fringe. Some
have taken a Nash-Cournot approach to the problem (Salant, 1976; Lewis and Schmalensee,
1979; Ulph and Folie, 1980); others have taken a Stackelberg approach, with the cartel acting
as a leader and with much attention being payed to the problem of time inconsistency of
the open-loop equilibrium in such a case (Gilbert, 1978; Newbery, 1981; Ulph, 1982; Groot,
Withagen and de Zeeuw, 1992, 2003).
In all of this literature, the cartel has been assumed to last until the resource stocks
under its control are exhausted. But there are various reasons why this may not be the
case: regulators may force a cartel to break up, or cartel members may defect to free ride
on the output restrictions of the members that remain loyal to its goal. The question then
arises as to what are the consequences for the cartel’s optimal output path of knowing that
at some time in the future it will have to break up into an oligopolistic industry? In the
case of a static cartel, there are clearly no consequences: it will simply produce during its
existence the same monopoly output as it would if no break-up was envisaged, and the
industry will revert to the static oligopoly equilibrium output afterwards. But when the
cartel faces an intertemporal problem, the answer is not so simple, since the initial state
faced by the oligopolist after the break-up then depends on the cartel’s decisions during its
existence.
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We will focus on the cartelization of an industry extracting a nonrenewable resource.
There are N identical ﬁrms, each owning a stock of the resource. The initial stocks are
assumed to be of equal size. A cartel formed by these N ﬁrms anticipates that at some
future time it will have to break up. After the break-up, all ﬁrms become Cournot rivals. It
would seem that under such circumstances, the cartel may want to choose remaining stocks
in order to reduce their rivalry from that date on. The aim of this paper is to study the
implications of this for the cartel’s extraction path.
We will show that a cartel that anticipates a break-up before the resource stocks are
exhausted will not only choose to produce during its existence at a higher rate than it would
otherwise, with this rate being a decreasing function of the cartel’s life, but it may even
want to deplete the resource at an increasing rate, contrary to what is usually expected of a
non-renewable resource industry under concave proﬁt functions, be it cartelized or not. We
will also show that up to some level of the initial stocks, the greater the initial stocks, the
greater the quantity of stocks depleted during the cartel phase, but that beyond this level of
initial stocks, the relationship is reversed: more initial stocks will imply less stocks depleted
during the cartel phase and more left over for the post-cartel phase.
The model is developed in the Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize of the temporary
cartel equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We will assume that the cartel must maintain the initial symmetry, by allocating equal
quotas to its members during the cartel phase1, and, for ease of exposition, will restrict
1This begs the issue of optimal asymmetry, which we leave for future research. For even if we have at
the beginning perfect symmetry, the cartel may have an interest in allocating diﬀerent quotas to diﬀerent
members, if all it cares for is total industry proﬁt. Such asymmetric quotas would result in an asymmetric
Cournot oligopoly at the time of cartel dissolution. We can expect that for a given aggregate industry stock
at the dissolution time, the more asymmetric the distribution, the greater will be the industry proﬁt. For,
at the extreme, if at dissolution time only one ﬁrm has a positive stock, we have a monopoly. Industry proﬁt
under monopoly would be greater than under oligopoly with the same stock evenly divided among ﬁrms.
The feasibility of such asymmetric behavior on the part of the cartel obviously requires some form of proﬁt
redistribution.
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attention to symmetric equilibria in the oligopoly phase. Let q denote the individual rate
of extraction of the typical ﬁrm and Q = Nq the industry’s rate of extraction. The inverse
demand function will be denoted P (Q) and will satisfy the following assumptions:
A1 P (Q) > 0 for Q ∈ [0, ξ) and P (Q) = 0 for Q ∈ [ξ,∞), for some ξ ∈ (0,∞);
A2 P (Q) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and P ′(Q) < 0;
A3 P ′(Q) + qP ′′(Q) < 0 for all q ∈ [0, Q], Q ∈ [0, ξ);
A4 P (Nq)q attains a unique maximum at some q ∈ (0, ξ).
The extraction cost function, C(q), will be assumed to satisfy:
A5 C(q) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with C ′(q) > 0 and C ′′(q) ≥ 0.
Notice that these assumptions allow for marginal revenue and marginal proﬁt to become
negative beyond some level of output. They thus exclude, for instance, a constant elasticity
demand function.
Suppose the cartel knows that it will be dissolved after some exogenously given period of
time τ . Using superscripts c and o to denote respectively the cartel and the oligopoly that
follows and given the perfect symmetry that holds throughout amongst the N ﬁrms in the
industry, the cartel’s problem can be formulated as:
max
{qc(t)}
∫ τ
0
N [P (Nqc(t))qc(t)− C(qc(t))]e−rtdt + Ne−rτV oi (x c(τ))
subject to:
x˙i(t) = −qc(t) (1)
xi(0) = x0 (2)
where
x c(t) = (xc1(t), x
c
2(t), . . . , x
c
N(t)), (3)
4
and r is the rate of discount.
V oi (x
c(τ)) is the value function of each individual ﬁrm in the oligopoly game that begins
at τ with initial stocks x c(τ). We will assume it to be diﬀerentiable. Under symmetry, at
τ , we have xi(τ) = xD for all i, where xD denotes the stock left to each ﬁrm at dissolution.
Hence:
x c(τ) = xD = (xD, xD, . . . , xD). (4)
If τ = 0, then xD = x0 and the problem is simply that of an oligopoly game between N
identical resource ﬁrms. The resulting equilibrium output path may be denoted {qo(t)| t ∈
[0, T o(x0)]} where T o(x0) ∈ (0,∞] is the endogenous period of time taken by the oligopoly
to exhaust the resource. On the other hand, if τ = ∞, then the problem reduces to that of a
monopolist that controls N identical resource stocks and, without loss of generality, depletes
them simultaneously and symmetrically. The resulting output path will be {qm(t)| t ∈
[0, Tm(x0)]} where Tm(x0) ∈ (0,∞] is the period of time taken by the monopolist to exhaust
the resource. It is easy to show that Tm(x0) ≥ T o(x0).
In fact the monopolist outcome occurs for all τ ≥ Tm(x0). The case where τ ∈ (0, Tm(x0))
is the interesting case of the temporary cartel, to which we now turn.
3 The temporary cartel equilibrium
As already stated above, the temporary cartel wants to maximize the proﬁt of the represen-
tative ﬁrm, knowing that after τ , all ﬁrms become Cournot rivals. The resulting output path
is {qc(t) | t ∈ [0, τ)} during the cartel phase and {qo(t) | t ∈ [τ, T c(x0) = T o(xD) + τ ]} dur-
ing the oligopoly phase, where T c(x0) denotes the total time taken to exhaust the resource
stocks x0 when the temporary cartel is involved and T
o(xD) is that taken by an oligopoly to
exhaust the resources when beginning with stocks xD.
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with the temporary cartel’s problem is:
Hc = N [P (Nqc(t))qc(t)− C(qc(t))]−Nµ(t)qc(t), (5)
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where µ(t) is the shadow value associated with the resource stocks.
In addition to (1) and (2), we have as necessary conditions:
P (Nqc(t)) + Nqc(t)P ′(Nqc(t))− C ′(qc(t))− µ(t) = 0 (6)
dµ(t)
dt
= rµ(t) (7)
and the transversality condition
µ(τ) =
dV oi (xD)
dx
⎛
⎝= ∂V oi (xD)
∂xi(τ)
+
∑
j =i
∂V oi (xD)
∂xj(τ)
⎞
⎠ . (8)
Consider ﬁrst the transversality condition (8), which provides a boundary condition for
(7). It says that the value of leaving to each member ﬁrm an additional unit of the resource
in stock at the dissolution time must equal the value to the ﬁrm of itself and each of its rivals
beginning the oligopoly game that follows with an additional unit of reserves. The latter
will depend crucially on the properties of the value function V oi (x).
It is clear that
V oi (0 ) = 0, (9)
since, in that case, none of the ﬁrms hold any stock of the resource and there can be no sales.
Furthermore, if we denote by π the Cournot-Nash equilibrium proﬁt of the corresponding
static oligopoly game, then
lim
x→∞V
o
i (x) =
π
r
, (10)
since if each ﬁrm were to hold an inﬁnite stock of the resource, the non renewability constraint
would be lifted (the shadow value of the stock would be zero) and the oligopoly problem
would reduce to a static one repeated forever.
As x approaches inﬁnity, the function V oi (x) may approach π/r from either above or
below. If it approaches from above, then the function necessarily attains a maximum value
greater than π/r for some x ∈ (0,∞). We will restrict attention to this case and assume:
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A6 V oi (x) is strictly quasi-concave in x, with a unique interior maximum at xˆ and a unique
point of inﬂexion at x˜ > xˆ, so that:
1.
dV oi
(
ˆx
)
dx
= 0 and
dV oi (x )
dx
> (< ) 0 for x < (> ) xˆ;
2.
d2V oi
(
˜x
)
dx2
= 0 and
d2V oi (x )
dx2
< (> ) 0 for x < (> ) x˜.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. 2
Note that the transversality condition (8) is obtained from the ﬁrst-order condition for
the determination of xD. At equilibrium, xD must also satisfy the following second-order
condition:
−∂µ(τ)
∂x
+
d2V oi (xD)
dx2
< 0. (11)
By condition (7), we can write, for any t ∈ [0, τ ] and any s ∈ [0, t]:
µ(t) = µ¯(s, x(s))er(t−s) (12)
where µ¯(s, x(s)) denotes the value attributed at t = s by the cartel to a marginal increase
in the stocks of each member at that date, given that their stocks are then x(s). But from
the structure of the problem for the cartel phase, we know that, for a given xD:
µ¯(s, x(s)) = µ¯(τ − s, z(τ − s, x(s))) (13)
where z(τ − s, x(s)) = x(s)− xD is the stock still to be depleted during the interval of time
τ − s remaining to the cartel phase. Equation (13) simply says that, given xD, the shadow
value to the cartel of adding marginally to the stocks existing at s is the same thing as
the shadow value of adding marginally to the stocks (x(s) − xD) left to deplete during the
2It can be veriﬁed that, for instance, with a linear demand and constant marginal cost, a symmetric
open-loop equilibrium satisﬁes those assumptions. On the other hand, a constant elasticity demand function
does not, since then V oi (x) monotonically approaches π/r from below as x tends to inﬁnity. Recall however
that our assumption A4 rules out a constant elasticity demand function.
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interval of time τ − s remaining to dissolution. In particular, for s = 0, we have:
µ¯(0, x0) = µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)), (14)
and, substituting into (12):
µ(t) = µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))e
rt, (15)
where µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)) denotes the value to the cartel, at t = 0, of the marginal unit of stock
depleted by each of its members during the whole cartel phase.
Furthermore, from (13) we know that:
∂µ¯
∂τ
=
∂µ¯
∂(τ − s) = −
∂µ¯
∂s
(16)
and
∂µ¯
∂xD
= −∂µ¯
∂z
= − ∂µ¯
∂x(s)
. (17)
Hence the ﬁrst and second-order conditions (8) and (11) for the determination of xD can
be rewritten, respectively, as:
−µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))erτ + dV
o
i (xD)
dx
= 0 (18)
and
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
erτ +
d2V oi (xD)
dx2
< 0. (19)
Substituting from (15) into (6), we can write the implicit solution to that condition as
qc(t) = ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)). (20)
Thus
z(τ, x0) =
∫ τ
0
ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))dt. (21)
Since by assumptions A3 and A5 the proﬁt function is strictly concave and hence marginal
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proﬁt (the left-hand side of (6)) is strictly decreasing, qc(t) is well deﬁned and unique.3
The following lemmas will now be useful:
Lemma 1 At equilibrium, (i)
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂τ
> 0 and (ii)
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
< 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating totally (21), we get
dz =
{
ϕ(τ, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)) +
∂µ¯
∂τ
∫ τ
0
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂µ¯
dt
}
dτ
+
{
∂µ¯
∂z
∫ τ
0
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂µ¯
dt
}
dz,
where, from (6),
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, x0))
∂µ¯
=
ert
2NP ′ + N2ϕP ′′ − C ′′ < 0, (22)
the denominator being negative by assumptions A3 and A5.4 Therefore
∂µ¯
∂τ
=
−ϕ(τ, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))∫ τ
0
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂µ¯
dt
> 0,
which proves part (i), and
∂µ¯
∂z
=
1∫ τ
0
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂µ¯
dt
< 0,
which proves part (ii).
Lemma 2 xD(τ, x0) is a monotone decreasing function of τ .
3Note that the assumptions (A3) and (A5) also guarantee that the second-order necessary condition for
the maximization of the Hamiltonian in (5) is satisﬁed.
4Note that
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
< 0 corresponds to the strict concavity in x of the value function for the cartel
phase given xD, which follows from the strict concavity of the proﬁt function.
9
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (18) keeping x0 ﬁxed gives:
dxD
dτ
=
[
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂τ
+ rµ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
]
erτ
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
erτ +
d2V oi (xD)
dx2D
.
The denominator is negative by the second-order condition (19). As for the numerator, we
know that from (12) and (13), we have:
µ(τ) = µ¯(τ − s, z(τ − s, x(s)))er(τ−s).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to s and using (1), we ﬁnd that:
−∂µ¯(τ − s, z(τ − s, x(s)))
∂τ − s − q(s)
∂µ¯(τ − s, z(τ − s, x(s)))
∂z
− rµ¯(τ − s, z(τ − s, x(s))) = 0
or, and using (16) and setting s = 0:
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂τ
+ rµ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)) = −q(0)∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
> 0.
by part (ii) of Lemma 1.
Therefore the numerator is positive, independently of the sign of µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)).
Lemma 3 For any x0 > xˆ, there exists a unique τˆ(x0) such that xD(τˆ(x0), x0) = xˆ and
xD(τ(x0), x0) < (> ) xˆ for τ > (< ) τˆ(x0).
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that ∂xD(τ, x0)/∂τ < 0. Furthermore, xD(0, x0) = x0,
for there is then no cartel phase, and limτ→∞ xD(τ, x0) = 0, since it is never optimal for the
monopolist to leave some resource unexploited at TM(x0). For x0 > xˆ, it must therefore be
the case that xD = xˆ crosses xD = xD(τ(x0), x0) from below once and only once.
Assume then x0 > xˆ. By assumption A6 and Lemma 3, we will have
dV oi (xD)
dx
= 0 and
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dV oi (xD)
dx
> (< ) 0 for τ > (< ) τˆ(x0). It follows from this and condition (8) that if τ = τˆ(x0),
then µ(τ) = 0. Hence, to satisfy (7), we must have µ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, τ ]. Similarly, if
τ > τˆ(x0), we must have µ(t) > 0 and if τ < τˆ(x0), we must have µ(t) < 0, for all t ∈ [0, τ ].
Substituting for µ(t) = 0 into condition (6), we get that if τ = τˆ(x0), then the cartel
will, while it exists, choose to deplete the resource at a constant rate qc(t) = qsm, where
qsm = (x0 − xˆ)/τ represents the constant rate of output that would be optimal for a static
monopolist.5
Since, by assumption A3 and A5, the left-hand side of (6) is a decreasing function of
qc(t), we will have qc(0) > qsm if µ(0) < 0 and qc(0) < qsm if µ(0) > 0.
More generally, we can state:
Proposition 1 For any x0 > 0, the cartel’s rate of extraction, q
c(t), t ∈ [0, τ ], is a decreas-
ing function of the length of the cartel phase.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to τ , we get
dqc(t)
dτ
=
∂ϕ(t, µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0)))
∂µ¯
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂τ
< 0,
by (22) and part (i) of Lemma 1.
Therefore, for any x0, the shorter the anticipated time to dissolution, the more the cartel’s
rate of output will diverge from the dynamic monopoly output at any time during the cartel
phase.
We may now characterize the output path of the cartel phase when x0 > xˆ as follows:
Proposition 2 For any x0 > xˆ, the rate of depletion of the resource stocks during the cartel
phase will be:
1. increasing over time starting from qc(0) > qsm if τ < τˆ(x0);
2. constant at qc(0) = qsm if τ = τˆ(x0);
5This constant monopolist output would constitute the equilibrium extraction path if both τ and x0 were
inﬁnite.
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3. decreasing over time starting from qc(0) < qsm if τ > τˆ(x0);
Proof. From conditions (6) and (7), we know that when τ < (>) τˆ(x0), and hence
µ(τ) < (>) 0, marginal proﬁt (the left-hand side of (6)) must be decreasing (increasing) over
time for t ∈ [0, τ(x0)). By assumptions A3 and A4, this means that qc(t) must be increasing
(decreasing) in t, starting at qc(0). That qc(0) > (<) qsm when µ(τ) < (>) 0 was established
above. For the same reasons, when τ = τˆ(x0) and hence µ(τ) = 0, marginal proﬁt must be
zero and qc(t) must be constant for t ∈ [0, τˆ(x0)), given by qc(t) = qsm = (x0− xˆ)/τ(x0), the
static monopoly output.
At dissolution, the extraction rate must jump up to the oligopoly path that follows from
that time on. Since the oligopoly game is time autonomous, the oligopoly path will in fact
be similar to what would have occurred had there not been a cartel phase, only now with
initial stocks of xD < x0 instead of x0, and hence a shorter period of time to exhaustion. The
jump must be upward, since otherwise the resource stocks would never be fully depleted.
The intuition underlying those results is clear. A µ(t) that is negative, means that the
cartel attaches a negative marginal value to the resource stocks. This means that if it were
possible, it would choose to destroy, at the outset, some of the stocks held by each cartel
member in order to reduce the rivalry between them and hence increase their proﬁts in the
ensuing oligopoly phase. This not being possible, it chooses to do the next best thing: it
begins extraction not only at a higher rate then it would if the possibility of dissolution did
not exist, but at a higher rate than would a static monopolist. Because of discounting and
the Hotelling rule, this rate of extraction will increase over time throughout its existence in
order to leave the oligopolists with the desired stocks at the time of dissolution. However,
in doing this, it foregoes proﬁts during the cartel phase in exchange for greater proﬁts in the
oligopoly phase. This arbitrage will be suﬃciently proﬁtable to justify a rate of extraction
higher than the static monopoly rate only if the dissolution date — and hence the increase in
proﬁt from the oligopoly phase — is not too far away (τ < τˆ(x0)). If the time to dissolution
is farther away (τˆ(x0) < τ < T
M(x0)), then, although it is still proﬁtable to leave smaller
12
stocks at dissolution than it would if it were on the dynamic monopolist’s path at that
time — which explains why it will extract more at each date than along the monopoly path
— the trade oﬀ becomes not suﬃciently proﬁtable to justify attaching a negative marginal
value to the resource stock. This is why µ(t) is then positive. As a consequence, the rate
of extraction is then lower than that of the static monopolist and decreases over time due
to discounting. The cartel only behaves as a true dynamic monopolist if it does not have to
envisage dissolution at all (τ ≥ TM(x0)).
What if x0 ≤ xˆ? Then necessarily dV
o
i (xD)
dx
> 0 and µ(t) > 0 for all τ > 0. For levels of
initial stocks that low, although the cartel will still want to extract more during the cartel
phase than would the dynamic monopolist over the same time period, the gains from the
reduced competition during the oligopoly phase is insuﬃcient to make it worth doing so at a
rate greater than that of the static monopolist. We would then observe a decreasing output
path during the cartel phase, as is usually expected of a natural resource monopolist.
Because xD is a function of both τ and the initial stock x0, it is interesting to consider
as well the eﬀect on the cartel behavior of a change in x0, keeping τ ﬁxed. Diﬀerentiating
(18) with τ ﬁxed, we get:
dxD
dx0
=
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
erτ
∂µ¯(τ, z(τ, x0))
∂z
erτ +
d2V oi (xD)
dx2
> 0, (23)
since the denominator is negative by the second-order condition (19) and the numerator is
negative by part (ii) of Lemma 1. Thus xD(τ, x0) is a monotone increasing function of x0:
for a given dissolution date, the greater the initial stocks held by each member, the more
stocks the cartel will wish to leave for the oligopoly phase when it breaks up.
However the portion of the total stocks allocated to the cartel phase does not vary in a
monotone fashion with x0. To see this, let x˜0(τ) denote the solution to xD(τ, x0) = x˜. Such
a x˜0(τ) exists and is unique since limx0→∞ = ∞, xD(τ, 0) = 0 and xD(τ, x0) is monotone
increasing in x0. We can then state the following:
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Proposition 3 With τ ﬁxed, the stocks allocated to the cartel phase are an increasing (de-
creasing) function of x0 if x0 is smaller (larger) than x˜0(τ).
Proof. The stocks allocated to the cartel phase in equilibrium are z(τ, x0) = x0−xD(τ, x0).
By the deﬁnition of x˜, we will have:
d2V oi (xD)
dx2
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
<
=
>
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
0 if x0
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
<
=
>
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
x˜0.
Therefore, from (23):
dz
dx0
=
(
1− dxD
dx0
)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
>
=
<
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
0 if x0
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
<
=
>
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
x˜0.
Choosing xD to satisfy the transversality condition (8) determines how the total initial
stocks, x0, is divided between the cartel phase (z = x0 − xD) and the oligopoly phase
(xD). The transversality condition says that the allocation between the two phases must be
such as to equate the marginal value of the stocks allocated to the cartel phase (µ(τ)) to
the marginal value of the stocks allocated to the oligopoly phase (dV oi (xD)/dx). Such an
allocation maximizes the total value of the initial stocks x0.
As long as x0 < x˜0(τ), both marginal values are decreasing functions of the stocks
allocated to the phase, i.e., ∂µ(τ)/∂z < 0 and d2V oi /dx
2 < 0. Both marginal values are
positive if x0 < xˆ+ τq
sm and both negative if x0 > xˆ+ τq
sm (in which case the initial stocks
x0 are larger than the cartel would like). The transversality condition then dictates that a
marginal increase in the initial total stocks be allocated partly to the cartel phase and partly
to the post-cartel phase in order to maintain the equality of the marginal values. Therefore,
if x0 < x˜0(τ), we have dz + dxD = dx0 > 0, with dz > 0 and dxD > 0.
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However, if x0 = x˜0(τ) then we have d
2V oi /dx
2 = 0. The marginal value of stocks to the
oligopoly phase is negative and reaches a minimum, while the marginal value of stocks to
the cartel phase, also negative, continues to decrease as a function of z. The only way to
continue satisfying the transversality condition after a marginal increase in x0 is to allocate
it entirely to the post-cartel phase (i.e., dxD = dx0 > 0 and dz = 0). Allocating some of the
increase to the cartel phase would result in a lower total value of the stocks.
When x0 > x˜0(τ), we are in a situation where the marginal value of stocks to the oligopoly
phase is increasing (d2V oi /dx
2 > 0), while that of stocks to the cartel phase continues to
decrease with z. Therefore, in order to maintain the equality of the two marginal values
when x0 is increased, the cartel will want to lower the stocks allocated to the cartel phase
and increase those allocated to the post-cartel phase, so that dz + dxD = dx0 > 0, with
dxD > 0 but dz < 0.
Thus, for any given τ , z(τ, x0) reaches a maximum at x˜(τ), with z(τ, x˜0(τ)) > τq
sm.
Furthermore, z(τ, 0) = 0, z(τ, xˆ + τqsm) = τqsm and z(τ, x0) must again approach τq
sm as
x0 tends to inﬁnity. In the limit, with an inﬁnitely large x0, the situation is one of static
equilibrium: the cartel produces the constant monopoly output qsm until its dissolution at
τ , after which production increases to the constant oligopoly output qo > qsm, which is
repeated forever.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown how, under highly reasonable assumptions about the value function associ-
ated with an oligopolistic equilibrium, an anticipated threat of dissolution will modify the
behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel. Not only will it in all cases induce the cartel to
produce more over the same period than it would in the absence of the threat of dissolution,
but if the initial stocks are suﬃciently large and the time to dissolution is suﬃciently short,
it will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stock and hence produce more than
it would even as a static monopolist. The rate of extraction must therefore be increasing
over time during the cartel phase. This result is due to the fact that the marginal value of
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the resource stocks is negative and therefore the Hotelling rule implies that its value must
decrease over time at the rate of discount, becoming more and more negative as the break-up
time approaches.
We have also shown that, given the anticipated time to dissolution, if the cartel wants to
maximize the total value of the initial stocks, the quantity it will choose to deplete during
its existence will at ﬁrst increase and then decrease as a function of the total initial stocks.
Eventually, if we let the initial stocks become inﬁnite, we ﬁnd that the anticipated dissolution
has no eﬀect on the behavior of the cartel, its rate of output being simply that of a static
monopolist throughout its existence. This is what is to be expected, since the cartel then
faces no intertemporal problem.
Although all the properties assumed for the value function of the oligopolistic ﬁrms in
the post-cartel phase will not hold for all proﬁt functions, they should hold for a large class
of functions and so should our results.
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